COLUMN-The 'madman theory' of U.S.-Iran negotiations: Ross Kerber

By Ross Kerber

April 8 (Reuters) - Former U.S. President Richard Nixon was famously described as pursuing a "madman theory" in his approach to wartime negotiations, creating the perception that he was capable of any destruction to cow adversaries. For Nixon, the historian Zachary Jonathan Jacobson wrote, "the ploy pivoted on the idea that he did not consider himself to be mad. He considered himself crafty."

The theory hardly led to long-term success in the Vietnam War, but it has been trotted out to explain the current outlook of U.S. President Donald Trump in his campaign against Iran. Trump has always styled his negotiations with a brash approach seemingly out of New York real-estate circles. He began bombing as talks with Iran were under way -- recalling the "sneak attack" strategy Japan once used to destroy the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

The Japanese attack also jolted the U.S. out of its isolationist mood during World War Two, although it's not clear Trump remembers that outcome based on my colleagues' reporting.

Will Trump's method work? Leaving the diplomatic and military questions to others, I thought it could be useful to speak with a bargaining expert who knows the increasingly connected worlds of business and geopolitics.

Cody Smith is a lecturer on negotiation and conflict resolution at Columbia University, and co-founder of the negotiation advisory and training services company CNCM. He also co-wrote a business school case study about the talks in Colombia that led to the 2016 peace deal between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). What follows is a transcript of our interview, edited for length and clarity. We spoke on Tuesday before Trump announced a two-week ceasefire in the Iran conflict to allow for further negotiations.

Question: Other academics describe Trump's negotiating style as that of a tribal chieftain. He's been the CEO of a private company as opposed to a public company CEO who has to manage a lot of constituencies. Maybe you could talk about Trump's style.

Answer: He talked about either wiping out a whole civilization or bombing Iran into the Stone Age. I see that largely as what he calls "truthful hyperbole," where he exaggerates things to a degree for emotional effect. He will often exaggerate, but sometimes will back away from his statements or ultimatums ... I am hopeful that is where we're at right now.

Q: Have you seen this sort of work in a business negotiation setting or diplomatic setting?

A: I’ve definitely seen threats issued. Threats for strikes in a union-management negotiation, for instance, threats to lay off or close plants. I've heard of other wildcat strike cases where bomb threats were made. Threats are sometimes made in business settings. In diplomatic settings, there it can go further.

Q: A labor strike is an interesting comparison, that's sort of the mutually assured destruction option where it's no good for anybody. But it sometimes has worked like the United Auto Workers strike of a couple of years ago. If your opponent is bringing a really heavy hand to these negotiations, what do you do?

A: I think about what is Trump's and Iran's best alternative in this context.

Q: I'm glad you brought that up. You've described that as the BATNA, right? The “best alternative to a negotiated agreement.”

A: That’s right. Your Plan B (is) your walk-away option.

Q: Both sides need to be thinking about their own internal constituencies as well. If you're the Iranians, you have a certain number of supporters within the country who have shown they've been willing to absorb enormous suffering. But the government is not particularly popular.

A: There’s definitely this side like the Revolutionary Guard Corps working hard to consolidate power. I think that their greatest fear is actually their people revolt against them. If this escalates and there are large-scale attacks on civilian infrastructure, on power grids, etcetera, then that could drive the people in a rally-around-the-flag effect.

Q: Trump must know that the Iranians know that. If you were a U.S. military officer, what would you be advising Trump at this point? He's made all these threats and maybe it's from his New York real-estate background?

A: I can't speak as a government official, but what I can say as an analyst of the situation would be that he has options that don't make him necessarily look weak. He doesn't necessarily have to walk away or climb down entirely in order to avoid fulfilling an ultimatum. He could launch a targeted strike against a high-value target within Iran.

I think he cares a lot about how he appears in negotiations. Whether he cares as much about what the Russians or other countries are thinking, I think he cares a lot more about what his domestic constituency thinks, what the swing voters might think going into the next election. Their perceiving of this situation is more essential to him than anybody else, so he wants to look strong to them.

Q: Does that give him more or less flexibility in his dealings with other countries?

A: I think that gives him more flexibility in this case because he can deliver a victory speech of sorts to his domestic constituency relatively easily.

Q: As I was preparing for this I looked up the history of Nixon and the “madman theory,” where you want to convince the other side that you are willing to do anything. Is that a strategy you've ever seen?

A: In general, you want to have the other side to some degree think that you are sane. You want them to think that you're a rational actor because then they can influence you and you can influence them, and there's a way to work together effectively. That is I think quite critical and especially in a long run negotiation. You have to build up trust. If you're acting like a madman, there's no consistency there, and so you're not going to accomplish the goal that you're seeking to accomplish.

Q: I would just want to go back because (his) approach to negotiations has certainly served Trump up until now. It's won him the presidency twice.

A: The madman approach, I don't know how much he's actually deployed it consistently, right? So at some points he will use truthful hyperbole. He will use bombast to perhaps browbeat an opponent into submission. Sometimes that may have worked in the past, sometimes it maybe has not.

Q: If you’re the Iranians, you see the president shifting his goals and outlining different objectives almost every day in this conflict. Let's say generically, if you're in a negotiation with a partner, opponent -- part-ponent, that's my new word -- what is your approach to negotiating with somebody who's changing their goals all the time?

A: I typically would want to negotiate with somebody who understands their interests really well, who understands their objectives very well, and who is able to set a strategy.

Q: As I speak to you, I realize there's a certain level where we're way beyond the worlds of business, where companies are not able to launch armies at each other and destroy buildings and kill people.

A: I would note business deals usually take months, maybe a year or two, whereas peace deals can take longer. You mentioned the Colombia case, it took (about) two years of back-channel negotiations before they even got to the substantive stuff and then it was something like four years of very very intense negotiations with dedicated teams.

Q: Experts say what Trump is talking about in terms of destroying civilian infrastructure would be war crimes or certainly would be potential war crimes. If he crosses that line, does that help or hurt him at the table?

A: I can't speak to that whether or not it is a war crime. What it is, it's not something I would ever advise. The things that would serve him at the table are the things that weaken the decision makers in Iran's BATNA. I don't see how massive attacks on civilian targets achieve that goal.