BREAKINGVIEWS-US-Iran deal may be pale imitation of 2015 version

By Afiq Fitri Alias

LONDON, Feb 23 (Reuters Breakingviews) - Donald Trump is negotiating with Iran, while parking aircraft carriers off its coast. The U.S. president’s assertion on 19 February that “something” will happen within 10 days implies military action is near. But it also raises the question of what any eventual Washington-Tehran deal might look like.

Current and former diplomats frame this moment as a hunt for a new version of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As was the case a decade ago, Washington wants to restrict Iran’s ability to produce nuclear bomb‑grade material, and its ballistic missile programme. The first JCPOA compelled Tehran to keep its enrichment at a level where the isotope U-235 represented only 3.67% of its uranium. This time, the goal is to drag Tehran’s current 60% level — dangerously close to the 90% weapons‑grade threshold — back down to the low single digits.

The quid pro quo, though, is different. The 2015 deal was painstakingly assembled over two years, with Europe, Russia and China all in the negotiating room and a large tranche of sanctions relief that initially prompted Iranian GDP to jump by almost 9%. The 2026 version is a bilateral negotiation driven by a U.S. president currently offering little in the way of incentives beyond the threat of a U.S. strike. That’s why Tehran - rattled by a deepening economic crisis and the fallout from January’s protest crackdown which left thousands dead – is dangling U.S. access to joint oil and gas fields, investment in its largely untapped mining sector, and the prospect of revived aircraft purchases once worth over $16 billion under the JCPOA.

Several off-ramps remain. The U.S. could launch a limited strike and negotiate afterwards. Trump could walk away without a deal, or Iran could accept one without a shot fired. The Gulf states may help police a deal or publicly back the idea of a regional enrichment consortium, where some of Iran’s uranium could be housed beyond its borders.

This range of outcomes partly explains why oil prices have not meaningfully spiked beyond $70 a barrel. But talk of a “JCPOA 2.0” glosses over a basic problem. While last June’s 12-day war weakened Iran, it has been bolstering its defences and is less likely than in 2015 to be coerced by brute force, especially given the U.S. now apparently lacks the element of surprise. A strike could prompt Iranian retaliation against U.S. or Gulf energy assets — hence why neighbouring states are trying to lower the temperature.

Even if Trump’s brinkmanship pays off, the scope of any agreement looks narrow and seemingly limited to nuclear talks. Washington would essentially be buying an enrichment cap it largely had eight years ago, while leaving Iran’s missile programme largely untouched. That means any successor to the JCPOA is likely to have a slimmed-down definition of “joint” – and be far from comprehensive.

CONTEXT NEWS

Iran has signalled concessions in indirect talks with Washington, saying it could export a significant portion of its highly enriched uranium, dilute the remainder, and join a regional enrichment consortium if its right to “peaceful nuclear enrichment” is recognised and sanctions are lifted, according to an Iranian official quoted in a Reuters exclusive published on February 22.

The official also said that an “interim agreement” was possible despite the gaps between Iran and the United States.

Iran has also floated the idea of offering deals “in areas with high and quick economic returns”.

"Common interests in the oil and gas fields, joint fields, mining investments, and even aircraft purchases are included in the negotiations," foreign ministry deputy director for economic diplomacy Hamid Ghanbari said on February 15, according to the semi-official Fars news agency.